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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to distinguish, following Jerry Fodor, a version of Standard Realism concerning psychological state types, along the lines of causal functionalism, from a version of realism like Fodor’s intentional realism (scientific intentional realism) which incorporates the language of thought hypothesis. ​[1]​ I attempt to assess how Standard Realism and Fodor’s intentional realism fare with respect to two rough conditions, condition α and condition b.  
Condition α is meant to do some justice to the following intuitive thesis: The type-token distinction can apply to the content of psychological states, what the states are about, or of, what they present or represent, what they are directed at.  The same state of affairs, or scene, or event can be presented to different subjects (or represented by different subjects).  Each subject can be related in a certain way to the same state of affairs as other subjects.  In each case, each of the subjects’ presentations or representations will be presentations or representations, roughly speaking, of the same type.  On this view, as the type-token thesis applies to words and sentences so it can apply to their mental analogues concepts and thoughts. The general thesis which condition α tries to capture is that the type –token distinction can apply to the content of psychological states as it applies to sentences and words.  
Condition b, on the other hand, is meant to state the idea that the intentional object of our perceptions, intentions, beliefs, desires and the like, what our intentional states are about, has  causal relevance, makes or can make a difference to how we act. Conditions α and Condition b are the following:  
Condition α. Token psychological states, for instance, a particular belief, a particular desire, intention and the like, are (at least partly) individuated by their propositional content. For instance, Peter’s belief that the cat is on the mat, is individuated partly by its propositional content which is reported by the sentence that the cat is on the mat.  Peter’s desire that the cat is on the mat, has the same propositional content. Assuming Peter’s belief and his desire are toward the same state of affairs, we can say that they have different propositional content tokens but both tokens are tokens of the same type.  ​[2]​
 Condition b.i Psychological states are in some cases causally efficacious (or are subsumed by laws that hold) in virtue of their intentional/propositional content. 
or
 ii. The intentional content of an intentional (psychological) state makes or can make a difference to how a subject acts.  ​[3]​

The issue of Realism about psychological states is approached here from the perspective of what kind of theoretical entities a psychological theory would have to posit.  It is not approached for instance as sometimes realism and antirealism (or irrealism) with respect to meaning or mental (intentional) content, the content of mental states i.e. as the question whether there is some fact of the matter with respect to whether an expression means what it does, or an experiential state or a belief, or desire has the content that it does.​[4]​  It is not also approached from the standpoint of what we could dub as realism with respect to the existence of propositions, if we translate ‘content realism’ to ‘proposition realism’. Do propositions exist? Do such objects that can be the propositional objects of propositional attitudes, are abstract, they are true or false or have essentially conditions of satisfaction, or are sharable exist? ​[5]​  This latter question is approached indirectly since I take it that Jerry Fodor’s species of intentional realism (content realism) relies at least on two assumptions: One. The assumption that intentional states, in his case propositional attitudes are relational states, relations of subjects to propositions. And  two, on assumption one relies much of the predictive force of folk psychology.  
As I understand it, Fodor tries to answer  the question: how a spatiotemporal particular, like a subject (of experience or belief) can be related to an abstract proposition—which, ex hypothesi is an object which lacks causal powers since it is placed outside a spatiotemporal realm— by employing the language of thought hypothesis. His answer, as I take it following Stalnalker (1987) is that the subject can be related to an abstract proposition, if the subject is related by a computationally specifiable relation to a sentence token which specifies the meaning of the corresponding proposition, in the subject’s own cognitive economy. However Fodor (Psychosemantics) formulates the question of intentionality as the question: How can there exist such objects that are both a. the bearers of semantic content while at the same time b. causally efficacious or endowed with causal powers? Fodor’s answer is that the objects that can play such a role must be analogous to signs and sentence tokens. Sentence tokens are symbols and therefore unproblematic objects. Like the sentence tokens written in this paper. ​[6]​ 
In what follows I attempt to sketch two strong realist construals of psychological states: Standard Realism and Fodor’s version of Scientiic Intentional Realism.

II. Standard realism and Crude Causal Functionalism

Standard Realism according to Fodor (1992) takes off from crude causal functionalism.  We can sketch a crude causal functionalist thesis as a thesis thesis that fixes the reference (or of (the concept)) of psychological types, for instance of (the concepts) of types of experiences via the network of causal generalizations in which they figure. Barring considerations of multiple realization implicit in a functionalist position, we can take Standard Realism to take off from the idea that types of psychological states are distinguished by their typical ‘causal syndromes’. We can then begin to sketch a realist position by using the Ramsey sentence of the postulate of some term-introducing theory that tries to capture psychological types.  Usually for such an approach to count as realist it should posit as Lewis puts it: ‘A system of states that come near to realizing folk psychology.’ (Lewis 1983:124) We will follow some of Lewis’ insights taking off from his (1970) approach with respect to the problem of how to define theoretical terms in general using some already understood and known vocabulary.  
A theoretical term is one which is introduced by a specific scientific theory at a particular time. Such a term can denote for Lewis a hypothetical entity. Lewis’ proposal is that theoretical terms reduce to existentially quantified variables (following Ramsey) and that a theory’s analytic part can be distinguished from its synthetic part (following Carnap). The vocabulary of the term introducing theory consists of ο- terms  and τ-terms. The o-terms are the ones assumed to be antecedently understood (before the new theory emerges) and they can belong to any syntactic category. Lewis asks us to think of the postulate T of a new theory in terms of which we can formulate the new theory in question as a sentence. In this sentence new theoretical terms will occur. (τ-terms) The other terms of the scientific vocabulary are the ο-terms. O- sentences are  sentences where only o- terms occur.
In order to formulate the postulate of theory T  we must first roughly collect all the platitudes with respect to the theoretical states our new theory proposes.   Lewis writes: ‘The postulate of T can be written as exhibiting the τ-terms therein. ‘T [τ1..τn] where τ1… τn are the theoretical terms.’ (Lewis 1970 : 430)
We then replace the terms standing for the theoretical terms (τ1..τn) with names, so that we can construe the postulate of the theory T in a grammatically uniform way (which can signify whatever can be reported by ο-terms). According to Lewis:
 ‘All occurrences of τ-terms in the postulate of T are purely referential (none can be denotationless), open to existential generalization and to substitution by Leibniz’s law.’ (Lewis 1970: 429)  
Lewis then replaces all names by corresponding variables ‘T [x1…xn ]. By doing this according to Lewis we get 
‘the realization formula of T’: T [x1…xn]  ‘Any n- tuple of entities that satisfies this formula, under the fixed standard interpretation of its o- terms, may be said to realize, or to be a realization of, the theory T. Therefore we recognize the postulate of T as the sentence that says that T is realized by the n-tuple of entities denoted, respectively, by the T-terms τ1…τν.’ ( Lewis 1970: 431)
 The postulate of the theory T will be one of its realizations.  The Ramsey sentence of  T (on the other hand)… says only that T is realized: 
‘x1…xn  T[x1,…xn].​[7]​ ​[8]​ 
 We then extract one by one the new variables and define the name in terms of the sentence that remains to form a corresponding predicate. This predicate, if it includes every claim that is constitutive of the given term can be uniquely satisfied. So we can existentially quantify over it. Lewis writes: ‘Given our definitions we can eliminate τ-terms in favor of the definite descriptions whereby we have defined them.’ (Ibid.) Theoretical terms are treated as definite descriptions. So, the last step is that for each term one can drop the existential quantifier and get a definite description of the sort of the state (theoretical term) which satisfies such and such. ​[9]​  
  Lewis takes it that the τ-terms ‘ ought to name the components of the unique realization of T if there is one, and ought not to name anything otherwise.’ ​[10]​( Lewis 1970: 434) We saw that τ-terms then are treated as names and then defined by means of definite descriptions as ‘the state that satisfies such and such’ We thus get something like ‘τ1 names that entity which, followed by some n-1 entities, comprises an n-tuple identical with and only n-tuples that realize T.’ (Ibid.)
In the case of psychological states it is hard to see how the new scientific theory will relate with the o- terms or whether such a theory concerns the o- terms themselves. Lewis’ own stance is kind of ambivalent at this point and I will not attempt to illustrate his ambivalence but will follow his discussion in his 1966. But suppose we have a theory which consists in typical common sense generalizations of psychological states as defined via their typical causal syndromes. We can introduce a postulate of this theory if we take it that its theoretical terms are defined by their causal role in typical cases. Thus the causal role of pain is connected with pain behaviour etc. If we take all the commonsense platitudes of folk psychology and do something of the sort just described above we get the following general picture: We get an abstract web of causal structures. Each psychological type of state that an organism can occupy can be represented by a node in the causal web, which uniquely determines the place of the type of state in this causal network.  Each type of state is in effect associated with its Ramsey sentence, which specifies the conditions of its holding.   
Causal functionalism in this rather crude version—which lacks any teleological elements—seems to ascribe to types of mental states causal role, which for some is the hallmark of a state’s reality. Also it gives a sense in which psychological types are interdefinable as we usually have it.​[11]​ What comes out of such a general treatment is a web of causal states distinguished by their actual and potential causal relations.  If an organism occupies one psychological state demarcated by the web, it is clear from the states’ position in the web what the subject/organism will be disposed to do next.  Thus if one occupies  M1 that might tend to cause him to occupy M2 M3 M4, but not say Mj or Mn according to how the actual and potential causal relations are fixed in the abstract causal web described. Lewis himself states in his (1966) where he identifies types of experiences via their typical causal syndromes that this approach concerning types of experiences (in arguing for a type-type identity thesis) does not apply to the intentional objects of experiences, what the state is of or as of, if there are any. For instance it is silent on whether it can identify the type of experience of seeing a red wall as an experience of or as of a red wall.  This view might seem to make more sense for sense-experiential states, which traditionally are treated as being devoid of intentional objects, under an (orthodox) understanding of intentionality as intensionality. ​[12]​  
Nonetheless, Jerry Fodor in ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation’ in A Theory of Content and Other Essays (1992) takes causal functionalism to require a further step in order to define Standard Realism.​[13]​  Fodor applies crude causal functionalism only to propositional attitudes rather than experiences for which he is officially agnostic.  According to Fodor what runs along with the picture of psychological states, here propositional attitudes, embedded in a causal web of states is another network generated by the inferential, implicational or semantic (as Fodor typically takes them) relations that hold between the propositional objects of such states. After all, propositional attitudes are usually treated as attitudes to propositions. If the causal functionalist approach wants to preserve one of the characteristic features of propositional attitudes, their intentionality or aboutness, their referring to such and such, it must take it that a state’s causal role and its propositional content go hand in hand, they are two facets of the state in question, unlike Lewis’ version.  What Fodor adds is that at the same time that the network of causal states is generated, by the approach outlined as characteristic of crude causal functionalism, there is another autonomous network which is generated by the inferential (implicational, semantic?) relations that hold between propositions.
Thus a belief with the content that Mary left and Peter wept has as its propositional object the proposition that can be reported by the sentence that Mary left and Peter wept. This propositional object is linked by relations of entailment and inference to the proposition that Mary left and to the proposition that Peter himself wept and to the proposition that Mary did something or that it is raining right now, and so forth. The proposition that P and Q implies the proposition that P, and the proposition that Q, and the proposition that Q or R , and so on. These inferential relations are among the essential properties of propositions for Fodor. 
But how can one attribute the right propositional objects to the causal states in question that are identified by their causal role? By establishing partial isomorphisms between the web of causal states defined by the crude causal functionalist approach and the inferential web of propositions.  But how can one establish the right isomorphisms in the first place if one has divorced the causal dimension of psychological states from their contentful dimension? The general idea seems to run as follows: Construing distinct propositional objects as corresponding to distinct causal states we can assign to the causal states the right propositional objects. According to Fodor we can do that since: [We] can deduce the causal consequence of being in a mental state from the semantic relations of its propositional object. (Fodor 1992: 15)
We can establish such isomorphisms because we take it that the implicational structure of psychological states and their causal structure mirror each other, they go hand in hand.  If the above holds then by asking (ourselves) what a subject would be prepared to do if he entertained in some way a propositional object we could predict the causal consequences of his ensuing behaviour and map propositions to causal states. As Fodor states this:
 The crucial point is that (the isomorphism) constraints the assignment of propositional contents to these mental states that the latter exhibit an appropriate pattern of causal relations….Under such an isomorphism, the causal role of a propositional attitude mirrors the semantic role of the proposition that is its object. (Fodor 1992:15)
 The above however seems to hold if :
you can deduce the causal consequences of being in a mental state from the semantic relations of its propositional object.  (Ibid.)

So the attribution of propositional contents to causal types is not arbitrary exactly because of the above mirroring. On the Standard Realist view then according to Fodor’s sketch, types of psychological states are unstructured and semantical properties  ‘arise from isomorphism between the causal role of mental states and the implicational structure of propositions.’(Fodor 1992: 15)

Why is Fodor dissatisfied with Standard Realism?  I will attempt to show that Fodor is dissatisfied with Standard Realism in virtue of its failure to accommodate condition α.  Condition α states that particular psychological states with a common intentional object might be partly individuated by their intentional/propositional object. That different token states might have the same intentional (propositional) object means that they have something in common. For instance, a common understanding would have it that they are different attitudes to the same state of affairs.  
If Peter believes that the cat is on the mat and if Peter desires that the cat is on the mat, then Peter’s belief and his desire have a common intentional or propositional object, namely that the cat is on the mat. They are different relations to the same state of affairs, sometimes willed, believed or hoped for by Peter. And it is the same state of affairs which at one point can delight Peter which can at a later point disappoint him terribly.  Though the function of desire differs from that of belief, a desire and a belief might have a common propositional object. At the same time Fodor wants to hold on to more than intrasubjective similiarity of content, in case the same state of affairs is willed, desired, believed or entertained by a single person.  If Peter believes that snow is white and Marco believes that snow is white, then there is a sense in which they share at least what they believe, that their beliefs are about the same state of affairs, that they have a common propositional object. Their token contents (the contents of each’s particular belief) are tokens of the same type which is sharable. 
I think Fodor’s version of psychological realism incorporating the language of thought hypothesis requires something like the above distinction as a starting point, that token states when they have the same propositional content are token states, at least partly, of the same type. This starting point is intertwined with his argument about the serious prospects of a top down approach to the mind and a social science of (computational) psychology that does not employ an analogous distinction. It seems to run as follows (see Fodor 1993, 1998 etc): 
Assuming a regularity view of causation whereby explanation proceeds by the subsumption of events under regularities, it follows that psychological explanation proceeds by the subsumption of events under psychological types.  But the types which a science of psychology must employ quantify over the content or propositional object of propositional attitudes. It is on the basis of the relations between contents (propositional objects) that such folk psychological generalizations hold. The example of folk psychological law that Fodor provides is of the following sort: ‘
 if you want to –and you believe that you can’t—unless you—then, ceteris paribus, you will perform an action that is intended to be—‘. (1993, 4) 
Resulting from this argument is a conception of propositional content as real in so far as it is on its basis that the psychological generalizations hold.  It is in virtue of the content of each propositional attitude that it can enter in these lawlike ceteris paribus psychological generalizations, so in that sense have some causal role or relevance and accommodate condition bi.  Fodor’s further argument is that for these sort of laws to hold intersubjectively it is required that contents can be public or shared. (so that the token content of different propositional attitudes of different subjects can be tokens of the same type, thus the condition of intersubjective synonymy of contents holds.) The idea is that the type—token distinction at the level of propositional content of distinct propositional attitudes is required for the holding of the folk psychological laws intersubjectively. This is reflected by the lower level mechanisms that implement such laws. 

  What are then some general arguments against Standard Realism and for the language of thought hypothesis?  As I understand it, they all seem to assume condition α and argue that SR cannot satisfy condition α.

III. Some general considerations against Standard Realism and Inferential Role Semantics:

What is the common functional role associated with say Peter’s belief that p and the desire that p, for instance  the belief that the cat is on the mat and the desire that the cat is on the mat?  Probably none.  So there would be no commonalities in the functional role of the two contents, in Peter’s cognitive economy, and a desire and a belief with the same content would have nothing in common, they would not be tokens of the same type (or intentional sort). The same kind of argument can be raised for the claim that one can have different attitudes to the same propositional content at different times.  
On this sort of viewpoint one of Fodor’s arguments against inferential role semantics seems to rest.  Fodor attributes the thesis that ‘meaning is use’ to inferential role semantics, where the use of some symbol are the inferences its use licences. The idea is that we can take it that the propositional/intentional content of a propositional attitude is constituted by its inferential liasons to other contents in a subject’s cognitive/psychological economy. Suppose we define causal role as inferential role in a person’s cognitive or psychological economy.  Suppose Peter and Marco in seeing the same red vase believe that they are seeing the same vase. Peter infers from seeing it, that this vase is his grandma’s favourite vase. Marco infers that it resembles the vase he broke at the age of five which issued in severe punishment.  If the above inferences constitute the content of their respective beliefs and the content of their respective beliefs is constituted by all of its inferential liaisons to other contents in Peter’s and Marco’s  psychological or cognitive economy, this implies according to Fodor a violation of the requirement of intersubjective synonymy of content.  No individual could mean or think the same by one’s words as another individual, if the content of one’s belief was constituted by all of its inferential liaisons to other contents.  No notion of intersubjective synonymy of content (or meaning) would be available and therefore condition α would be violated.  
On the other hand, if someone wants to hold a moderate holistic view which states that only some of the inferential links of a given content are constitutive of it, he/she would have to appeal to analyticity to pick out only the partial inferences that would be connected to particular contents. And analyticity is according to Fodor bankrupt, a notion suspect from Quine’s arguments. I will not try to rebut this line of argument here. It aims to show one line of disagreement between Fodor’s own view and SR. It must be said however that synonymy of content is also a notion afflicted by Quine’s arguments. ​[14]​

IV. How does  Fodor’s  Scientific Intentional realistic view differ from Standard Realism?

The issue is complex.  As I understand it here, Fodor’s intentional realism states that propositional attitudes require the existence of their vehicles.  Those vehicles of propositional content must have a structure which is isomorphic to the structure of the content they carry.  Thus vehicles of content are structured states, as opposed to Standard Realism.  The vehicles of content are mental representations –symbols with syntax and semantics.  Their syntax must mirror their semantics in analogy to the way in which in Standard Realism semantic (cum implicational or inferential) structure must mirror causal structure.  In this case causal structure is the syntactic structure of symbols.
More generally we can take it that from Fodor’s standpoint  what a realist about psychological states asserts is the existence of a plausible scientific psychological scheme that respects folk psychology, to an approximation. One must first assume that the folk psychological scheme is to approximation true and on that basis build a scientific psychology. The cognitive psychology in question is computational and informational. A vindication of folk psychology is achieved by showing how we can build a scientific psychology on its basis. That is why Fodor’s psychological realism is a species of scientific realism. It is a species of intentional realism since it posits the existence of states that necessarily have content and causal powers. As Fodor expresses his starting point in Psychosemantics one is a realist about there existing beliefs, desires and the like—
‘in fact as endorsing them—just in case it postulates states (entities, events, whatever, satisfying the following conditions:

(i)	they are semantically evaluable
(ii)	they have causal powers
(iii)	the implicit generalizations of folk psychology are largely true of them, ( Fodor  1987:10)

Fodor’s  scientific intentional realism then states that not only must we posit the existence of propositional attitudes, but must posit analogous states at the level of cognitive psychology which satisfy the characteristics attributed to them.  The cognitive states (which must be realized by a system at some level) must be at the same time semantically evaluable, causally efficacious and such that folk psychological generalizations can quantify over them while at the same time being true of us, in effect satisfy conditions (i)—(iii).    Propositional attitudes presuppose the existence of mental representations.  Mental representations are symbols in a language like medium. As such they can satisfy a type—token distinction. 
 	Fodor argues that symbols of a sentential rather than an imagistic sort can satisfy both (i) and (ii); they satisfy (i) by always symbolizing something, therefore always being about or of something; they satisfy (ii) by being concrete particulars thus causally efficacious or the bearers of causal powers at the same time. Think of a symbol like a sentence written three times this page: ‘Snow is white’ ‘Snow is white’ ‘Snow is white’. The three token sentences are three tokens of the same type. Now each of the three sentences is a physical sign on the page, or in case I utter the three sentences an acoustic sign, thus a physical particular of some sort. The same distinction applies when one thinks to oneself analogous contents with the above words. Or when you and I think that snow is white.  However, this is too easy it might seem. For thoughts unlike written sentences on a piece of paper or a blackboard seem to be in the first case perspective dependent , thus if one takes indexical elements into mind the above story will not come out right as easily as the above analogy might make it seem. 
 However the above analogy makes it easier to think of the syntactic properties of symbols as those to which they owe their causal efficacy.   The syntactic properties of symbols (like a written sentence) are properties like their shape, in virtue of which they partake in causal interaction with other symbols.  Syntactic properties are second-order physical properties, each of them necessarily linked with a semantic property. ​[15]​  As tokens symbols are concrete particulars with syntactic properties.  At the same time symbols symbolize something and thus have semantic import. But their causal efficacy is due to their syntactic rather than their semantic properties. Those run parallelly to their syntactic properties because of the mechanisms that implement thinking which are classically computational. ​[16]​ 
For Fodor we can strengthen the idea of isomorphism between the causal role of psychological types and the mostly logical relations that hold between propositional objects /contents of pa’s we originally encountered in his discussion of Standard Realism, if we ground it in the mechanisms that implement thinking, if we take it that thinking is a classical computational process in which things can be arranged in a way in which syntactic processes and semantic processes go hand in hand. If thinking is classical computation that it can be proved (by the Church –Turing theorem) that the semantic properties of symbols go together with their syntactic properties. 
According to Fodor:
we know from formal logic that certain of the semantic relations among symbols can be, as it were. ‘mimicked’ by their syntactic relations; .the machine is so devised that it will transform one symbol into another if and only if the symbols so transformed stand in certain semantic relations; e.g.; the relation that the premises bear to the conclusion in a valid argument.  (Fodor 1992: 22)
Formal relations that hold in a valid argument can be portrayed as syntactic relations between symbol strings.  At the same time valid arguments and valid forms of transitions of thinking—those that preserve truth, have the same form.  Fodor suggests that there is an analogy between arguments and trails of thoughts that both seem to preserve truth. This means that thoughts seen as processes are tokenings of the symbols of the language of thought in virtue of their syntactic properties.  And since computational processes show how to connect the syntactic features of symbols with their semantic features, there is a parallelism between the semantic properties of symbols and their syntactic level.  But in order to argue for the view that thinking is a classical computational process Fodor must take very seriously his initial analogy when discussing Standard Realism that
 the causal roles of mental states typically closely parallel the implicational structures of their propositional objects.’ (Fodor 1992:19) Fodor continues: ‘Were this not the case—were there not this general harmony between the semantical and the causal properties of thoughts- there wouldn’t after all, be much profit in thinking… What you want to make thinking worth the while is that trains of thoughts should be generated by mechanisms that are generally truth preserving’ (Fodor 1992: 21) 
Thus his initial analogy in Standard Realism, is grounded in this case in the mechanisms that implement thinking which are classically computational and truth preserving. Since computers ‘show us how to connect semantical with causal properties for symbols’ we can take thinking to be implementable by classical computational processes.  
 	So Fodor’s Scientific Intentional realism can satisfy condition α, which SR cannot satisfy accordin to him and also condition bi (which SR seems to satisfy in the first place, since it identifies causal states directly through their causal syndromes, in typical cases). Fodor’s version satisfies condition bi on the grounds that the content of propositional attitudes must be such as to figure in folk psychological laws. Also if syntax mirrors semantics then syntactic structure which does the causal work guarantees semantic structure, in the sense that the system is so designed as to generate the above consequence.

Criticism of  Fodor’s scientific intentional realism:
I attributed to Fodor a strong reliance on condition α, the thesis that different propositional objects can fall under a propositional type, at least on the basis of the thesis that if psychological laws are to hold of us, inter-subjective synonymy of content must hold. But is it plausible to rely on inter-subjective  content synonymy in order to provide an idiolectical account of some speaker’s or interpreter’s meaning? Further, is it the case that the type-token distinction as applied to words and sentences matches the type-token distinction with respect to their mental analogues: ‘thoughts’ and ‘words’ or lexical items, in Fodor’s case?     
 One way in which Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis might be understood is as the thesis that the vehicles of content (or on a stronger construal inner causal states) have a structure analogous to that of their contents.  Though this picture is not evident in Fodor, it is evident in Hartry Field’s version of the language of thought hypothesis. Field writes more clearly that the attribution of propositional objects to mental states requires ‘to postulate a system of entities inside a believer which was related via a structure preserving mapping to the system of propositions.’ (Field 1978:31) For one crucial question is, as Stalnalker sees it : is there any guarantee that propositions are structured themselves in any sense?  Further is Fodor’s isomorphism picture the right way to raise the attribution of propositional objects to causal states in the first place?
We saw that Fodor in building the case for Standard realism and his intentional realism has to take it that ‘Under the limits of the operative idealization) (viz. that )  one can deduce the causal consequences of being in a mental state from the semantic relations of its propositional object.’ (Op.cit) (Fodor 1992:15) But maybe the operative idealization is mistaken. For, how can we deduce from whether a subject would entertain a propositional content, the causal consequences of that entertaining? First, this presupposes that we already are interpreters have mastered language and are embedded within some linguistic community.  Second, only to stress the first point, to assign a particular causal consequence to the ‘entertaining’ of a propositional object, say to a particular belief of Peter’s that his house is located at Metaxourgeio, one would have to specify what kind of action could ensue from his belief.  But action could not really result from a single belief. To specify the causal consequences of entertaining some propositional object an interpreter could not do it without recourse to practically the whole or most of the cognitive repertoire of that subject.  How does Peter’s belief interact with his desire at the moment, and his other standing beliefs or wishes or intentions?  So it remains open whether Fodor’s picture is feasible. 
Further, condition b holds for Fodor because the objects of the attitudes are the relata of folk psychological laws and therefore a mark of causation on this view.  The implementation of folk psychological laws requires syntactic mechanisms which invoke tokenings of the syntax of symbols. Inferential (or semantic) relations are mirrored by syntactic operations because the syntactic mechanisms are truth preserving (and the inferential relations are those designed to preserve truth). Therefore if the system does not malfunction it is so designed as to ensure a harmony between syntax and semantics. But cannot one defend condition b on independent grounds and independent to any incentives for endorsing condition α?   
A case which seems to be tailor made for a defense of condition bii directly comes from considerations with respect to whether reasons are causes.  If one wishes to endorse the view that reasons are causes, according to Dretske one must say that the ‘semantic aspect of reasons, the what it is we believe and desire enters essentially in the explanation of what we do.’ (Drestke  ) Centrally the need to add condition b, that in some cases a state’s content grounds its causal powers or constraints the potentialities on which one may act, might be linked with  a gap for some left open by Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism. According to a line of criticism against anomalous monism, Davidson’s system leaves it open why it is in virtue of their psychological descriptions that mental events somehow partake in causal interaction.  Davidson himself (Davidson 1993,12 ) does not think that this objection carries any teeth since for him it really does not make sense to ask in virtue of which of the properties of an event its or one of its effects was brought about.  There are many descriptions of each event, either couched in psychological or in physical vocabulary, but they each pick out the unique event. As Davidson writes: ‘It is events that have the power to hane things, not our various ways of describing them” (Davidson 1993, 12) But on the other hand Davidson’s somehow artificial distinction between becausal explanations as invoking fact like entities and causal relations as invoking events independent of description seems to be kind of a hoc. ​[17]​
  A well cited example for Davidson’s instability is Fred Dretske’s example of the opera singer whose singing issues in the shattering of glass.  Dretske argues that it is not in virtue of its being a singing or the narrative of the story of the singing that the opera’s singing caused the glass to shatter but in virtue of particular properties like the pitch or frequency of the particular sound (though it is hard if not impossible for us to say the one without the other). But when I act on a desire or an intention or a belief it is the particular content of that desire that makes me act the way I act.  
Davidson leaves it, from this point of view, open why it is in virtue of its having certain psychological/mental characteristics that an event might bring about certain effects.  The same line of criticism can be applied to Fodor’s position. What Fodor provides for Dretske is not something which can elucidate why the semantic properties of some ‘structure’ made some difference, only that if you fix the syntax the semantics takes care of itself’. But sometimes we ought to say that what one desires believes intends wishes and the like makes or can make a difference to how one acts. Unlike the opera’s singer singing there are cases where ‘what one believes and desires makes a difference to how he acts.’ When I act on my desire to see a movie my desire seems to make a difference to how I act, organizes also my act. How does Dretske understand condition bii? Dretske attributes an essential role to belief in attempting to show how there can be reasons in a world of causes. The very general idea is that vehicles of content in the first instance are indicators (signs) of what they signify.  But to become beliefs they have to have the right sort of causal history which can elevate them to the status of beliefs.  They have to become ‘maps by which we steer’. As he elucidates his starting point
‘Beliefs (are) maps by means of which we steer….And if this metaphor is to have any validity, as I think it does, then what makes the map a map—the fact that it supplies information about the terrain through which one moves—must, in one way or another, help to determine the direction in which one steers. If a structure’s semantic character is unrelated to the job it does in shaping output, then this structure, though it may be a representation, is not a belief. A satisfactory model of belief should reveal the way in which what we believe helps determine what we do.’ (Dretske1988: 79)  
Dretske argues that he can provide a model of belief which shows exactly the above.  Dretske places a crucial role to learning in showing how a mere structure with the function of indication can be turned into a belief and control the output.  If his solution is satisfactory is an independent matter.  
We can find different kind of interpretations of condition b in the literature, without being necessarily committed to the claim that reasons are causes.  For instance we can be defend condition b on a picture like Stalnalker’s which directly links propositional attitudes with potentialities for action. Propositions on this view provide with the representation of alternative possibilities, the role of propositional objects is to distinguish between the alternative possibilties. From the assumption that propositions have logical relations it does not follow that they have linguistic structure or logical form. If by ascribing some propositional object to a particular attitude we presuppose that it has some mechanisms for representing and distinguishing between alternative situations we are not necessarily committed to the thesis that causal states must have something analogous to syntactic structure-must be sentence-like.  
 Or condition b. can be defended along a picture which seems to ensue from some analyses of the many layers of content. Here we have been dealing with the idea of content as information or as truth conditional content solely. On a rather different picture there is no unique way in which the mind’s directedness or its aboutness can be understood. ​[18]​ There many forms of aboutness and many forms of content. If ‘aboutness’ is generally understood as representation there are different ways in which something represents something, or something is about something. Stories represent differently than images or sounds, and a map represents differently to the above. 
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^1	  For the term scientific intentional realism see Loewer and Rey (1991:xxi) 
^2	  It is an open question as I am trying to formulate it in this paper whether intentional content or the intentional object of intentional states must be treated as propositional content. Propositions are usually taken as singular terms which denote some abstract entity which lacks causal powers is the object of propositional attitudes and correspond to shared meanings between different subjects. When however I refer to the intentional object or content of intentional states as in condition bii I try to be non committal with respect to whether it should be treated as propositional content. Condition bii takes intentional content to have some form of causal relevance which would not be easily formulated if we take propositional content to denote something abstract and thus something which lacks ex hypothesi causal powers.
^3	  Another formulation of condition b was suggested by Stathis Psillos. Condition b would run: the propositional content of intentional states in some case grounds their causal powers. On this view content could be seen as the categorical basis of certain causal powers.
^4	  Boghossian (1991) presents irrealism about content as deflationism about truth, since content is on this view truth conditional content, so irrealism about content boils down to irrealism about truth conditions and inevitably about truth. (see Boghossian 1990)
^5	   I picked out a cluster of properties associated with the category of propositions. Further questions are whether they are Russellian, Fregean or construed along possible worlds lines. Of course one can rightly protest that no one ontological category can play all the different roles attributed to propositions above. However it is essential to the thesis we are trying to sketch that propositions can play their role as the objects of attitudes so that attitudes can be taken as attitudes to propositions and that they are sharable as tokens of the same type.
^6	  The approaches to be sketched are already quite strong realist theses.  We can outline at least a weaker alternative on an interpretationist approach to psychological states according to which roughly the conditions for someone’s having psychological states are fixed by the conditions of their being interpretable.  
^7	  Lewis continues: ‘A third sentence which is the Carnap sentence of T, which is neutral as to whether T is realized, but says that if T is realized, then the n-tuple of entities named respectively by τ1..τn is one realization of T. The Carnap sentence is the conditional of the Ramsey sentence and the postulate.’ Lewis 1970:431   
^8	  Lewis says that the postulate of the theory (1) is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the Ramsey sentence and the Carnap sentence. (2) The Ramsey sentence and the postulate logically imply exactly the same O-sentences. (3) The Carnap sentence logically implies no O-sentences except logical truths.’ Lewis 1970:431
^9	   Cf. Rey (1997) 
^10	  In effect according to Lewis (1970) the denotations of τ-terms are specified by the Carnap sentences. Their senses at the same time are specified.  Their denotations are specified in any possible world.  ‘In any possible world, they are to name the components of whatever uniquely realizes T in that world, and they are to name nothing in that world unless T is uniquely realized there.’ ‘The sense of a name is given in full by specifying what if anything it names in each possible world.’  Lewis 1970: 435 Ηοwever Lewis does not treat names without denotation along Russell’s lines.
^11	  In Lewis (1966) he identifies such states via their first order realizers, so he combines functionalism with a type identity thesis.  Lewis’ (1966) argument concerns types of experiences. In his (1984) he seems to take it that the Ramsey sentence of the theory we were discussing won’t be a new theory at all but will realize analytic folk psychology. I am not concerned however here with the interpretation of Lewis’ complex position. 
^12	  I am referring here to an orthodox criterion of intentionality as being coextensive with the linguistic criterion of intensionality. Intensionality is a property which is exhibited by sentences reporting the psychological states of subjects and it creates intensional contexts. Intensional contexts are contexts where a. failure of existential generalization occurs and b. one cannot substitute one co-referring term with another while preserving the truth value of the whole sentence.  On this view, roughly propositional attitudes exhibit intensionality and thus are intensional but sense experiential states do not have propositional/intentional objects. See Crane (2001) for the denial that intentionality should be understood as intensionality.
^13	  Fodor himself is not concerned at all with conscious states such as perceptual experiences and takes intentional states to be propositional attitudes which are treated as relations between some subject and a proposition, paradigmatically beliefs desires intentions but also thoughts. This sort of view falls under an orthodox in the analytic tradition conception of intentionality as intensionality. 
^14	  For replies to Fodor on this argument see among others: Boghossian (1993) Harman (1987) Horwich (1997) (1998) Peacocke (1998).
^15	  See Davies (2005) 
^16	  A further complication is that syntactic properties of symbols are narrow whereas their semantic properties are broad. So why are they in tune as the mirror constraint and the isomorphism picture suggests? (See Fodor 1993)
^17	  On Davidson’s view causal relations hold between particular events (tokens) but becausal explanations deal with types of events and thus laws. The problem with this seems to be that anomalous monism depends essentially on the principle of the nomological character of causality in order for its three principles to count as consistent. But it seems that causal relations hold between token events independent of their descriptions. So there seems to be some clash.
^18	  See Davies (1995)
